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COMMENTARY 

LIMITS OF JUSTICE: THE COURTS' ROLE IN SCHOOL DESEGREGA­
TION. By Howard I. Kalodner and James J. Fishman. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Ballinger 1978. 
Reviewed by Mark C. Yudof* 
LIMITS OF JUSTICE is an ambitious book that seeks to ground 
the study of desegregation decisions in an empirical methodology. 
The eight case studies in the volume, sandwiched between an in­
troductory essay by Dean Kalodner and some concluding com­
ments by distinguished civil rights commentators,l draw on the le­
gal realist tradition of attentiveness to facts, social implications, 
social context, and rules in action rather than in the abstract;2 and 
on more modem notions of implementation research in the social 
sciences. 3 Dean Kalodner's essay appears premised on the notion 
that traditional modes of enforcing and monitoring court deseg­
regation decrees may not be efficacious-that the results of these 
paper decrees are fur from preordained. The assumption is that 
the implementation of court decrees into school systems and the 
formation of rules and policies are worth studying precisely be­
cause the outcomes are virtually uncertain and unpredictable. It is 
one that also characterizes the modem implementation literature: 
The article of faith that unites implementation analysts is a belief 
that the carrying out of a policy, the installation of a plan, or the 
enforcement of a law is neither automatic nor assured. On the 
contrary, both casual observations and systematic investigation 
suggest that the outcomes of social policies and innovative plans 
generally have been unpredictable and unfortunate, at least in 
* John S. Redditt Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin. B.A. 1965, 
LL.B. 1968, University of Pennsylvania. 
1. Derrick A. Bell, Jr. and Forbes Bottomly. 
2. See generally T. BENDITT, LAW AS RULE AND PRINCIPLE (1978); G. 
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); E. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973); Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law 
School, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 405 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971). 
3. See, e.g., G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN 
MISSILE CRISIS (1971); E. BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME (1977); A. 
GOULDNER, PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL BUREAUCRACY (1965); H. KAUFMAN, THE 
FOREST RANGER (1960); J. PRESSMAN & A. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION (1973). 
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the eyes of the designers. Academic research seeks to under­
stand and explain this uncertainty in outcomes; policy research 
aims to do something about it.4 
The difficulty of this approach, of course, lies in the execution of 
the case study technique in the field of school desegregation. The 
desire to move beyond theorizing based on the stargazing variety 
to theorizing grounded in the harsh realities of race relations in 
public school systems is not easily fulfilled. 
The contributors to LIMITS OF JUSTICE exhibit markedly dif­
ferent abilities to utilize successfully the case study technique. As 
Paul Berman remarked generally about implementation studies: 
[T]he literature consists mainly of atheoretical case studies of 
varying quality-some extraordinarily perceptive, others disap­
pointingly dull-whose claims to generality are questionable be­
cause the cases cannot easily be compared. . . . Reviewing a 
wide sample of these retrospective studies leaves one feeling 
somehow wiser but still uncertain as to how to apply this wis­
dom in other than the special circumstances already past. . . . In 
brief, implementation analysis lacks a conceptual framework that 
places individual studies within their larger sectoral context and 
facilitates cross-sectoral comparisons. 5 
It is often easy to lose one's way as one encounters, with tedious 
regularity, the references to demographic trends, the decline of 
white school populations in urban school systems, the resistance of 
school boards and school professionals to desegregation orders, the 
blow by blow (motion by motion, appeal by appeal) elaboration of 
court decisions, and the political scrutiny of each of the selected 
school systems. If idle theorizing, devoid of social and political re­
ality, is a sin, it does not make the unstructured, non-conceptual 
regurgitation of facts a virtue. Professors Robertson and Teitelbaum 
surely must be right when they argue that empirical studies are 
"merely the compost for the construction of a theoretical frame­
work,"6 a theoretical framework that explains relationships and out­
comes and yields insights into improving the implementation pro­
cess. Without some relationship to theory, all that is left is the 
compost. 
Perhaps one should not be too demanding of case studies, par­
4. Berman, The Study of Macro- and Micro-Implementation, 26 PUB. POL'y 
157, 160 (1978). 
5. Id. at 158-59. 
6. Robertson & Teitelbaum, Optimizing Legal Impact: A Case Study in Search 
of a Theory, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 665, 667. 
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ticularly those involving complex legal and social problems like 
school desegregation. It is easy to criticize, but much more difficult 
to criticize constructively. There is a tendency (or perhaps it is 
simply a reflection of my own thinking) to look to the physical sci­
ences for paradigms about ordering the world, determining the rel­
evancy of facts, deciding what to investigate, and explaining rela­
tionships.7 In addressing the philosophy of scientific revolutions, 
Kuhn, in the context of the physical sciences, speaks of inves­
tigating facts for three reasons: 1) To illuminate those facts which 
are particularly revealing of the underlying paradigm; 2) to use the 
facts as a basis for checking the predictions of the paradigm; and 3) 
to undertake empirical work which assists in the refinement of the 
paradigm and in the resolution of its residual ambiguities. 8 The 
case study in the social, political, and legal realm appears far from 
achieving such coherence. Case studies often multiply theories 
and, cpnsequently, bring disagreement rather than consensus on 
underlying propositions. The further accumulation of facts under 
such circumstances may simply increase the number of mysteries 
and throw further doubt on the already pluralistic character of so­
cial science wisdom. 9 Prediction and refinement are often 
casualties of social science progress, not by-products. 10 
There is no reason to believe that a group of extremely able, 
empirically oriented lawyers can undo these heady difficulties. At 
best they should be held to modest standards of illuminating fre­
quently ignored aspects of the desegregation process which may 
tell us something, however little, about the different ways in which 
school segregation problems may be resolved by legal institutions 
operating in a rich political, economic, and social framework of in­
stitutions and groups.ll 
Dean Kalodner has taken pains to narrow the scope of the en­
terprise which he co-edits. In his introductory essay, he asks how 
7. See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUcrURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d 
ed. 1970). 
8. H. KALODNER & J. FISHMAN, LIMITS OF JUSTICE: THE COURTS' ROLE IN 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 25-28 (1978) [hereinafter cited by page number only]. 
9. See generally Cohen & Weiss, Social Science and Social Policy: Schools and 
Race, in EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (R. Anson & R. 
Rist eds. 1977). 
10. Id. 
11. See, e.g., E. CATALDO, M. GILES, & D. GATLIN, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
POLICY (1978); R. CRAlN, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1969); Kirp, 
Block, Myers, Gamble & Koshar, Why Desegregation Didn't Happen: Race & School­
ing in Oakland, 87 SCH. REV. 355 (1979). 
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the courts may eliminate the vestiges of segregated school systems. 
He notes with regret the "flight" of the federal government from 
such matters,12 and the tendency of "many school boards [to] pur­
sue from the outset a course designed to shift the entire political 
burden of desegregation on the courtS."13 His framework is re­
markably instrumental. The question is not so much whether a 
school district· or state has committed de jure segregation or 
whether racially balanced schools within a particular geographic 
area are a constitutionally required remedy. The question is how to 
achieve a racial balance remedy once a violation of the fourteenth 
amendment has been found. How can courts make school boards 
and school bureaucracies cooperate in the objective? How can 
white flight be alleviated? How can the social costs of integration 
be reduced? How can compliance with a desegregation decree be 
monitored? How may the conditions for a quality, integrated edu­
cation for black and white students be achieved? 
In this light, Dean Kalodner makes detailed proposals for the 
use of experts early-on in the litigation to facilitate the fashioning of 
remedies. 14 He is concerned with the role and function of mas­
ters15 and state and federal executive branch agencieslS acting as 
court appointed monitors; and he focuses on the role of attorneys 
representing both school boards and plaintiffs. 17 In short, he 
searches for ways in which "the adjudication process could be im­
proved in its functioning. "18 His analysis is careful and balanced. 
He recognizes limits in the nature of adjudication, but does not 
seek to tum courts into administrative agencies. 19 On the other 
hand, the fact that solutions to "broad social problems must come 
from the legislative and executive branches of government"20 does 
not counsel judicial inaction: "[F]or all of the faults that have char­
acterized adjudication, it is not possible to conceive of a constitu­
tional system in which no institution of government is prepared to 
12. Pp.2-3. 
13. P.3. 
14. P.19. 
15. Pp. 8-11, 19-20. 
16. P. 21. Dean Kalodner is more dubious about the propriety of "court-created 
committees of citizens or parents": "Where the court chooses a citizen monitoring 
panel, there is generated a transfer of power from the school board to parents or 
other interested citizens. While such a shift may be politically justifiable, the role of 
the court in producing it is of doubtful validity." Id. 
17. Pp.21-22. 
18. P.23. 
19. See pp. 22-23. 
20. P.23. 
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declare and enforce constitutional rights. "21 His proposals involve 
the improvement of the adjudication process without altering "the 
essential character of the role of courts in school desegregation liti­
gation. "22 Walking a tightrope, he perceives an inverse relationship 
between the failure of political leadership in desegregation cases 
and the expanding equity jurisdiction of the courts in such cases: 
It is when the court is able to define the constitutional right to 
an education free of discriminatory school board action-and 
then confidently to expect the school board, the state commis­
sioner of education, or other state or federal officials or agencies 
to formulate and implement the requisite changes to implement 
that right-that the role of courts can be reduced to more tradi­
tional dimensions. The failure of political leadership to play that 
proper role has led to the expansion of equity jurisdiction; only a 
reversal of that failure will lead to the contraction of equity juris­
diction. 23 
There are ambiguities in the Kalodner analysis, ambiguities of 
which he is painfully aware. The instrumental approach makes 
sense only if the objective is clearly stated or understood (and if 
there are not multiple and conflicting objectives) and if the costs of 
alternative means can be calculated in relation to the benefits. This 
is not the case in school desegregation litigation. The courts have 
vacillated on the need and justification for racial balance remedies 
and on the degree of state involvement in school segregation nec­
essary to trigger a finding of a constitutional violation-ranging 
from adoption of neighborhood pupil assignment plans which 
predictably result in segregation to explicit separation of the 
races. 24 The target is a moving one, and the ends of the process 
are often subsumed by the process itself. The need for ongoing ju­
dicial supervision, the extraordinary breadth of the remedies, the 
complex nature and future orientation of the factfinding, and the 
multiparty structure of desegregation litigation make it far from 
21. Id. Kirp, School Desegregation and the Limits of Legalism, 47 PUB. IN­
TEREST 101 (1977); cf. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Returners, 35 WASH. & LEE 
L. REv. 949 (1978) (discussion of the proliferation and regularization of institutional 
decrees where courts have become judicial overseers of state and local governmental 
units). 
22. Pp. 23-24. 
23. P.24. 
24. See generally M. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned 
Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court (publication pending 
in Law & Contemporary Problems). Compare Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 
189 (1973), with Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977). 
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clear whether traditional litigation models can be shaped to the 
new exigencies. 25 
Unfortunately, many of the case studies in LIMITS OF JUSTICE 
lack the self-conscious incrementalism of Dean Kalodner's approach 
and ignore the ambiguities of the school desegregation process. 
With rare exception, the case study authors embrace the racial bal­
ance remedy without qualms and proceed to divide the world into 
good guys and bad guys-those who favor integration and those 
who do not. Perhaps the worst offender is Professor Smith. In 
analyzing the Boston desegregation case,26 his presentation closely 
resembles an advocate's brief. Pre-1960's racism in Boston is dealt 
with in a cavalier fashion in less than six pages. Along the way, the 
Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act, the distinction between de 
jure and de facto segregation, and the abolitionist movement are 
all but forgotten. The reader is told of lawless cops who will not 
maintain order, of "obstinate" boards of education, and of recalci­
trant white interest groups. "Community" appears to mean the mi­
nority community (or at least parts of it) and not the political com­
munity from which public officials are elected. If this served the 
purpose of illuminating the problems of desegregation, perhaps the 
presentational bias may be overlooked. But it is not the case. With 
all seriousness, the reader learns that there are difficulties in 
relying on the wrongdoers (school officials) for desegregation plans,27 
members of the Citywide Coordinating Council (a monitoring 
agency appointed by the court) brought "the hardened perspectives 
and positions of their constituencies" with them,28 the treatment of 
children is a volatile issue, desegregation remedies affect persons 
other than the wrongdoers, desegregation decrees bring resistance 
and polarization, and a 24-month old judicial decree cannot change 
two centuries of interracial hostility. 29 In short, a restatement of 
the problems substitutes itself for analysis. 
The pattern of the Smith case study is repeated in a number 
of the other case studies. For example, Jessica and Jeffrey Pearson 
opine that the Denver school board's response to black migration 
to traditionally white neighborhoods "was to maintain racial segre­
25. See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 
HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976); Mishkin, supra note 21; cf. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DAN­
GEROUS BRANCH (1962) (discussing the judicial branch of the government). 
26. Pp. 25-113. 
27. Pp. 105-08. 
28. P.109. 
29. Pp. 110-13. 
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gation in the schools in the wake of neighborhood change."3o 
Whether the neighborhood was white, integrated (even for a brief 
transitional period), or black, the school system maintained neigh­
borhood schools. The authors do not explain why this should pro­
vide the basis for a finding of constitutional wrongdoing. What is 
the significance of going from overwhelmingly white to overwhelm­
ingly black schools? Why is racial balance the objective? What 
might the school authorities have done? How does a school system 
prevent an integrated neighborhood from becoming predominantly 
minority? Or should it abandon neighborhood assignment policies? 
How would that policy alter demographic trends? 
Pearson and Pearson also argue that "the personal socio­
economic and ideological composition of school board members and 
the politicization of civil rights issues both explain why resistance 
to school desegregation hardened so dramatically. "31 In fact they ex­
plain remarkably little. The question is not whether high socio­
economic or low socioeconomic status individuals are "liberal" on 
race matters, but why those committed to integration are fre­
quently evicted from office only to be replaced by "anti-busing" 
public officials. The socioeconomic status of board members is not 
the independent variable in the analysis. Issues are not fortuitously 
politicized such that resistance to desegregation is increased. 
Politicization is itself a manifestation of resistance. If there is a les­
son to be drawn from the Denver experience (and that of many 
other school systems), it is that board members are frequently 
placed under enormous pressure to resist racial balancing of the 
schools; and they either succumb to those pressures or pay a high 
political price. 
The book is filled with tales of the decisions of progressive 
boards of education· being overturned by less progressive successor 
boards. Desegregation resolutions were rescinded in Denver, 
Detroit, Dayton, and other cities, according to Professor Hain. 32 
Ironically, this often compels plaintiffs to rely on the actions of a 
pro-desegregation board to build a case of de jure segregation 
against its successor. This sometimes leads to the bizarre result 
that cities with relatively progressive leadership on school and race 
matters are taken to court before those that have unambiguously 
engaged in racial discrimination. The precipitating event is the re­
30. P.218. 
31. P.219. 
32. P. 244 & n.101. 
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scission, but despite the assertions of Pearson and Pearson to the 
contrary,33 it is far from clear that such rescissions, by themselves, 
constitute discriminatory state action for purposes of the fourteenth 
amendment. 34 With the exception of Professor Hain's work on the 
Detroit desegregation case, the case studies in LIMITS OF JUSTICE 
all but ignore this frequently repeated political and legal pattern. 
The failure to treat the causes of politicization and anti-bUSing 
attitudes in the Denver case study is particularly disturbing in the 
light of the authors' emphasis on the alleged success of the Com­
munity Education Council in monitoring the Denver desegregation 
order. Once again, as in the Boston case, there is a court-ap­
pointed group of community monitors. This time, however, the 
reader is told that they get the job done. Why is that? How is 
Denver different from Boston? Because "the network [of monitors] 
draws from a cross-section of the community. It reaches into every 
school. ... [T]he network is the community."35 If the Community 
Education Council is truly representative of the community (could 
it be the community?), one would expect it to act like the Denver 
school board that rescinded the voluntary desegregation plans. If it 
successfully monitors the desegregation remedy, presumably this is 
because it is not representative of the larger community or it rep­
resents sympathetic constituent interests. Indeed, judicial interven­
tion in desegregation issues is premised largely on the notion that 
minority groups cannot successfully press their constitutional and 
educational interests in the political arena of the legislative and ex­
ecutive branches of government. Pearson and Pearson would have 
it both ways. Community resistance to desegregation expressed 
through the political processes counts for little,36 while court se­
lected monitors are perceived as representing the real political 
community. 
Another questionable aspect of a number of the case studies 
relates to generalizations about the educational disadvantages asso­
ciated with segregated schools (particularly for minority children) 
and the benefits associated with integration.37 Organization theo­
33. P.220. 
34. The Supreme Court ducked the issue in Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 
U.S. 189 (1973) and Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977). Reitman 
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (dis­
cussing the degree of state involvement needed to find violations of the fourteenth 
amendment). 
35. Pp. 221-22. 
36. See p. 214. 
37. Consider this remarkable statement in the Denver case study: 
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rists have frequently warned that there are distinctive organiza­
tional characteristics to public sector social service delivery systems 
such as education; the task is usually labor intensive and the output 
criteria are ambiguous as compared to private sector markets. 38 
Virtually all of the authors, except for Professor Kirp, appear una­
ware of this organizational literature, and some fall into the trap of 
failing to take into account the difficulty of specifying educational 
outcomes and their causes. Professor Smith, without documenta­
tion, describes the quality of education in Boston after the 
desegregation order as "vastly improved. "39 He fails to explain how 
or why it is improved and ignores the sorry circumstances of the 
implementation process. . 
James Fishman, in an otherwise insightful case study of the ef­
forts to desegregate the Ma~k Twain elementary school in Brook­
lyn,40 asserts that segregation may be proven by reference to 
demographic patterns, board action and inaction, and educational 
failures: 
Proof of segregation in fact and that the segregation was caused 
by school board action and inaction was relatively easy. The 
demographics spoke for themselves. The dreary record of com­
munity board inaction was not contradicted.... 
. . . The court visited the school. Combined with the sta-
Although it is difficult to gauge the quality of a school district, various 
impressionistic evaluations as well as statistical indicators suggest an erosion 
of educational quality. During the past several years, for example, the teach­
er turnover rate in the Denver school district has consistently declined. This 
is largely attributed to the improved salary schedule negotiated in 1969 
which rewarded career teachers and reduced teacher mobility. At the same 
time the pupil-teacher ratio has steadily dropped from 24 pupils per teacher 
in 1969 to 19.3 pupils in 1975. These indicators suggest improved quality. 
On the negative side, however, the student drop-out rate has risen from 
5.5 percent in 1971/72 to 6.6 percent in 1972/73 to 7.B percent in 1973/74 to 
B.5 percent in 1974175. Pupil achievement test scores have dropped in these 
years, and students in more and more of the district's schools fail to meet or 
exceed national achievement norms. Furthermore, public satisfaction with 
the school district has also eroded. More recent achievement test compari­
sons covering the 1972-1975 period, however, fail to suggest continued pat­
terns of decline. 
Pp. 	IBO-Bl (footnotes omitted). 
3B. See Berman, supra note 4, at 174-75 (citing J. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS 
IN AMERICA (1967)) (additional citations omitted). 
39. P. llO. 
40. Pp. 115-65. For example, Fishman notes that the school board "frequently 
misunderstood the legal process and the use of counsel." P. 130. Board members re­
acted to litigation by use of press conferences and by seeking to talk-out the problem 
with the judge as a fellow politician. Id. 
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tistics relating to reading scores, feeder patterns, utilization [of 
school capacity], indicators of intraschool segregation, the fact of 
segregation was irrefutable. 41 
Perhaps the reference to declining reading scores was simply an 
oversight. If the suggestion is that low reading scores are a conse­
quence of segregation, it is certainly a debatable point42 and one 
which is not supported by the Fishman case study. Minority group 
reading scores are generally below those of whites,43 and the role 
of segregation and integration in the causal chain is not clear. This 
does not mean, as Professor Bell seems to suggest in his commen­
tary, that integration is not worth the candle because Brown v. 
Board of Education44 and its progeny are addressed primarily to 
educational quality,45 but that such outcome data are irrelevant to 
the determination of a constitutional wrong. 46 At the remedy stage, 
educational quality concerns seem more appropriate, and Fishman 
is quite correctly concerned with such matters under the "magnet" 
school concept developed to integrate the Mark Twain School: 
Nor is there great concern. in the final order over the educa­
tion that blacks will receive in the other schools.... Extra re­
sources will go into Mark Twain to ensure the success of the 
magnet. But in a financially deprived school system, are there 
funds to go around for all kinds of students? 
There will be neither the resources nor the individuals to create 
another magnet school [if another school in the district begins to 
tip in its racial balance].47 
Perhaps the lesson to be learned is that the adjudication process 
fragments public policymaking. Courts resolve the dispute before 
them without thinking through the systemic consequences of their 
41. Pp. 131-32. 
42. See generally N. ST. JOHN, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: OUTCOMES FOR 
CmLDREN (1975); M. WEINBERG, MINORITY STUDENTS: A RESEARCH ApPRAISAL 
(1977). 
43. See, e.g., note 42 supra. 
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). J. COLEMAN, E. CAMPBELL, J. MCPORTLAND, A. 
MOOD, F. WEINFELD & R. YORK, EQUAUTY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966); 
C. JENCKS, M. SMITH, H. ACLAND, M. BANE, D. COHEN, H. GINTIS, B. HEYNS & S. 
MICHELSON, INEQUAUTY (1972); ON EQUAUTY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (F. 
Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972). 
45. Pp. 570-71. 
46. See Yudof, supra note 24; Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the 
Courts, 51 TEX. L. REV. 411 (1973). 
47. P.165. 
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orders. 48 A diversion of resources and gifted students to one inte­
grated school inevitably tears them away from other schools in the 
system. The overall quality of education for the vast majority of stu­
dents, at least as measured by resources, may suffer. 
Allowing courts to consider the educational context of deseg­
regation remedies carries with it many dangers in terms of the ex­
panded role of the courts in education policymaking. Professor 
Hain's enlightening study of desegregation49 in Detroit makes this 
abundantly clear. After the Supreme Court ruled that a metropoli­
tan remedy for overwhelmingly black Detroit was not constitution­
ally required in view of the nature of the de jure segregation, the 
NAACP sought a Detroit only racial balance remedy in which each 
school in the district would have a 65 to 35 ratio of black to white 
students. 50 This plan would have involved the reassignment of 
some 100,000 students51 out of a school population of approxi­
mately a quarter of a million students. The board of education pro­
posed a less extensive desegregation remedy. Federal District 
Judge DeMascio rejected both plans: 
[Judge De Mascio] ... believed desegregation [in majority black 
urban districts] only required that blacks be represented in sig­
nificant numbers in every school in the district, as evidence they 
were no longer excluded. It was not necessary, he believed, for 
whites to be as widely distributed. . . . "Equal facilities, inte­
grated faculties and meaningful guarantees that every student is 
welcome in any school" were, in Judge DeMascio's view, suffi­
cient indicia of a desegregated system. 52 
The principle ground for the rejection of the NAACP and 
board plans is not entirely clear. If racial balance is required as the 
remedy for past and/or present discrimination, why should the par­
ticular ratio of blacks to whites alter the remedy? If the remedy 
was simply one of nondiscrimination and not racial balance, then 
neither a token nor a substantial representation of blacks or whites 
in each school would be in order. Quite obviously, the court was 
influenced by the perceived educational dis utility in racially balan­
48. See generally Mishkin, supra note 21. N. GLASER; COURTS AND SOCIAL 
POLICY (publication forthcoming); D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 
(1977). 
49. Pp. 223-308. 
50. P.255. 
51. [d. 
52. P.280. 
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cing schools which were already two-thirds blacks. 53 How the court 
was able to judge the relative costs and benefits of integration un­
der such circumstances and why the consideration of such costs 
and benefits are legitimate only in majority black districts is far 
from clear. Further, the "welcome mat" theory of equal protection 
is strikingly reminiscent of freedom of choice and token representa­
tion remedies rejected by the courts in the late 1960's and early 
1970's.54 
If educational theorizing was implicit in the rejection of racial 
balance remedies, it was made explicit in the remedies actually ap­
proved by the court. Without the participation of plaintiffs' counsel 
(according to Professor Hain),55 Judge DeMascio proceeded to re­
fashion the public educational system in Detroit through a bar­
gaining process with the school board. The judge perceived the 
need for a stricter discipline code in Detroit, and he proceeded to 
write one when the board's code did not live up to his expecta­
tions. 56 He was openly critical of the legislatively mandated decen­
tralization of the Detroit school system into eight regions. 57 For 
reasons perhaps rooted in his own experience, the judge proposed 
(no party had) and ordered a major revision of the grade structure. 
He preferred that Detroit's students attend kindergarten through 
5th grade, 6th through 8th grade, and 9th through 12th grade 
schools, rather than the previously prevalent kindergarten through 
6th grade, 7th through 9th grade, and 10th through 12th grade sys­
tern. 58 The result was that the court's plan moved more students 
than the board's plan and "achieved about half as much deseg­
regation."59 How much of this had to do with remedying racial 
discrimination remains a mystery. More justifiably, DeMascio at­
tempted to put teeth into the revamped separate-but-equal doc­
trine by requiring various compensatory programs, with particular 
emphasis on reading and vocational education. 6o The United States 
53. Cf. Calhoun v. Cook, 430 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1975) (majority status of black 
students in each school indicates freedom from racial discrimination). Calhoun is dis­
cussed by Dean Kalodner at pp. 15-16. 
54. See, e.g., Creen v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Bd. of 
Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968); Moses v. Wash. Parish School Bd., 456 F.2d 1285 (5th 
Cir. 1972). 
55. P.278. 
56. P.294. 
57. P. 283 n.333. 
58. Pp. 286-87. There were numerous exceptions to the Board's K-6, 7-9, 10-12 
policy. P. 287. 
59. P.284. 
60. Pp. 292-94. See generally Yudof, supra note 24. 
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Supreme Court, with the grumbling acquiescence of Justice 
Powell, affirmed the educational components of the plan and the 
lower court's order that the state of Michigan be compelled to con­
tribute to the cost of their implementation. 61 The question of stu­
dent desegregation remained in the courts, after the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected Judge DeMascio's 
"welcome mat" theory of desegregation. 62 
After he brilliantly and painstakingly assembled his facts, Pro­
fessor Rain is content with a two paragraph summary of the 
Detroit litigation. 63 The reader questionably learns that the aban­
donment of Detroit by whites is "almost completed," the district 
court minimized the inconvenience for whites in his desegregation 
plan, and "only inclusion of the suburbs in a desegregation plan" 
has the potential for achieving racial balance for Detroit's black stu­
dents. Even less pointedly, one learns that "rough, maligned 
Detroit has shown a grace more genteel cities might envy. "64 The 
first set of conclusions required no case study, and the second con­
clusion pretends to substitute civility for theory. There is no 
discussion of how negotiated remedies in public interest cases dif­
fer from traditional legal remedies. 65 No guidelines are offered to 
show when a judge has overstepped his equity powers and when 
he is responding responsibly to a difficult situation. There is no 
analysis of whether school boards and bureaucracies are more likely 
to implement plans requiring specific educational components than 
those requiring the dismantling of neighborhood schools. There is 
virtually no mention that the majority of Detroit's population is 
black and Detroit has a black mayor and school superintendent. 
The implications that this black representation might have on the 
implementation of desegregation orders are not pursued. 66 Some­
how one feels wiser after reading the Detroit case study, but that 
wisdom points only to the past and not to the future. 
William Marsh makes a convincing case for the existence of 
northern style racial discrimination in his Indianapolis study,67 but 
misses a superb opportunity to examine the role of social science 
61. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
62. Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), afI'd, 433 U.S. 267 
(1977). 
63. P.306. 
64. [d. 
65. See Chayes, supra note 25; Mishkin, supra note 21. 
66. But see p. 281. 
67. Pp. 309-58. 
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evidence in the adjudication process. He is content to inform the 
reader that the termination of the litigation is not in sight, that no 
meaningful plan for desegregation has been adopted, and that 
there may be reason for hope in the recent election of a more pro­
gressive school board. 68 The Mount Vernon study69 is interesting 
in that it focuses on state courts and education agencies as the fo­
rums for desegregation issues. Its conclusion that civil rights advo­
cates erred in relying on the state commissioner of education and 
the state courts for a desegregation remedy is plausible, but I am 
suspicious about whether it is generalizable. 70 
Perhaps the best case study in the book is Professor Kirp's re­
search on desegregation in San Francisco. Kirp at least articulates 
the traditional liberal position on race and schools: 
[Superintendent] Spear's perception of the changing racial com­
position of San Francisco's public schools did not entail any dis­
tinct administrative reaction. His attitude [in 1960] reflected the 
classic liberal position: race or other group attributes should be 
irrelevant, individual characteristics controlling, with respect to 
any institutional decision. Thus, while the district's hiring policy 
"emphasizes the selection of the best qualified teachers available 
. . . ," and its educational policy stressed quality education 
geared to the capabilities of the individual student, the racial im­
plications of such policies constituted an inappropriate line of in­
quiry.... There existed no official statistics to document the 
impact of . . . [black migration to previously white areas on the 
racial composition of particular schools]. 71 
The traditional liberal wisdom may appear naive to some, racist to 
others, and of continuing vitality to still others,72 but it is clear that 
its rejection makes the task of achieving racial justice enormously 
more complex. Complexity only arises through the accompanying 
disagreement over the goals of school and race policies and laws, 
and the need to determine how, when, and why race may be taken 
into account. Professor Kirp's awareness of this complexity greatly 
augments his analysis of desegregation in San Francisco. His world 
does not neatly divide into evil-doers who oppose racial balance 
remedies and do-gooders who favor it. Fault is not easily assigned, 
68. P.356. 
69. Pp.359-409. 
70. See Crawford v. Board of Educ. of Los Angeles, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 
28, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976). 
71. Pp. 416-417. 
72. See, e.g., L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE (1976). 
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particularly when institutional and political factors are taken into 
account. 
The Kirp study elucidates several themes which render his 
collection of facts more intelligible. Professor Kirp does not assume 
a monolithic black or white community committed to a single race 
ideology,73 and hence he is not surprised to find tensions over pol­
icy within constituent groups and institutions. Indeed, he recog­
nizes that means and ends are frequently in a state of flux, and that 
permanent solutions will prove evasive: 
Issues as volatile as segregation are never resolved in any perma­
nent fashion. Organizations whose primary concern is the fur­
therance of minority civil rights do not admit to final successes; 
they recognize only the stage-by-stage resolution of continuing 
controversies, disputes . . . are constantly changing, the de­
mands constantly expanding, the inequality about which objec­
tion is voiced constantly becoming less readily detectable. 74 
The game changes over time. Equal facilities for blacks and whites 
may constitute an enormous civil rights victory at one point in time 
and a tremendous defeat at another. Successful resistance to the 
closing of a black neighborhood school may be a feather in the cap 
of a black politician on one day and a decisive defeat for integration 
on another. Racist white politicians may vow to resist freedom of 
choice plans to the point of disobeying court orders, only to em­
brace such plans in the name of parental choice and neighborhood 
schools at a later date. Much of the posturing and gamemanship, 
despite the grave consequences for black and white students, has a 
symbolic quality, and once a symbolic victory has been achieved, 
the pressures for change may abate: "[The realities of deseg­
regation may matter less than the willingness of powerful white of­
ficials] ... to defer to the wishes of the civil rights groups .... 
Once the symbolic victory had been secured, through the Johnson 
decision, most civil rights activists lost their interest in what hap­
pened."75 
Professor Kirp notes other factors which desegregation com­
mentators frequently overlook. The endless studies conducted by 
interest groups, experts, and school professionals may be a form of 
buying time because they are"studies in lieu of decisions. "76 Plain­
73. P.421. 
74. P. 423. See also Kirp, supra note 21. 
75. P. 489. See also p. 485. 
76. P.427. 
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tiffs in desegregation cases may not only lack the resources to for­
mulate and monitor desegregation plans, a point well made by 
Dean Kalodner, but they may lack the will to do SO.77 If the plan is 
promulgated by the board of education, it is the board that is put 
on the defensive, and plaintiffs may continue to pick away at the 
official position. Professor Kirp, however, fails to note a time­
honored rule of organizational politics: he who drafts the proposals 
frequently is able to confine the scope of discussion and limit 
changes to relatively inconsequential matters. On the other hand, 
he is mindful of the cardinal rule of organizational and bureaucratic 
behavior; incompetence may carry the day.78 Too frequently, lack 
of normative commitment to the court's decision and racial preju­
dice are words used to describe organizational responses that can 
best be understood in the light of the organization's utter inability 
to do what courts have required. Devising new school attendance 
boundaries, selecting new building construction sites, meeting the 
transportation needs of an integrated school district, and a myriad 
of other tasks may strain the abilities (and resources) of professional 
education administrators. 
Finally, Professor Kirp identifies the paradox that goes far in 
explaining all eight case studies in LIMITS OF JUSTICE: "Litigation 
represents an end-run around the political process of dispute reso­
lution. That is both its strength, from the advocates' viewpoint, and 
its limitation. "79 Constitutional litigation in the desegregation cases 
is an attempt to appeal the decisions of majoritarian institutions to 
judicial ones better insulated from the voices of the majority. In 
the realm of broad social reform, courts must listen to and take ac­
count of those voices if judicial orders are to be obeyed. A change 
in forums that results in a decisional outcome perceived as favora­
ble to a racial minority is undone at the implementation stage pre­
cisely because of the institutional characteristics of that forum. A 
strength at the point of decision becomes a weakness at the point 
of implementation. 
If the courts are to succeed in desegregation cases, there are 
three choices. First, they may conSistently and coherently articu­
late and defend their decisions and hope to succeed by moral per­
suasion over an extended period of time. The Supreme Court has 
gone far in dashing this hope by its inability to be consistent and 
77. P. 465. See generally Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1155 (1977). 
78. P.475. 
79. P.491. 
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coherent since its metropolitan desegregation ruling in 1974.80 Sec­
ond, the courts may temper their decisions in the light of popular 
concerns. Perhaps one may accurately describe Judge DeMascio's 
idiosyncratic response to segregation in Detroit as falling loosely 
within this category. The problem is that such moderation may un­
dermine the goal of racial justice in the schools. Surely, civil rights 
groups might prefer to fight for implementation of a far-reaching 
decree than to acquiesce in the formulation of remedies, perceived 
as meaningless, which may be easily implemented. Third, the 
courts may consciously attempt to probe the causes of popular, 
elite, and institutional opposition or noncooperation in deseg­
regation orders and to tailor their decrees and processes accord­
ingly. 
LIMITS OF JUSTICE is a first cut at the third type of judicial 
approach. The difficulties of devising an efficacious strategy, how­
ever, loom large. My own suspicion is that class conflicts have 
been subsumed under the category of racial discrimination in the 
school cases. Whites do not so much fear integration with blacks as 
integration with poor blacks. They perceive socioeconomic integra­
tion as a threat to the quality of education and as an invitation to 
school violence. Unless whites can be disabused of these notions, 
real or imagined, or unless the correlation between race and pov­
erty is sharply reduced, racial balance (if that is the appropriate 
constitutional goal) is likely to be strenuously resisted. If the courts 
are not to be charged with the broadest responsibility for curing 
perceived unfairness in the distribution of wealth, they must work 
at changing attitudes. But these problems of the mind are compli­
cated by the ineptness of school bureaucracies in assuaging these 
concerns. This explains the new "American dilemma," so ably de­
scribed by Professor Omeld: Americans increasingly favor integra­
tion in the abstract but forcefully resist the only realistic means of 
achieving it, the transportation of students from their segregated 
neighborhoods to integrated schools. 81 Neighborhood segregation is 
associated with wealth differentials, discrimination, taste, and other 
. factors. 82 If, by some wave of the magician's wand, neighborhoods 
in urban areas were to be integrated, the resultant school integra­
tion would strike many as "natural." The underlying reason is that 
80. See generally Yudof, supra note 24. 
81. C. ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? SEGREGATED SCHOOLS AND NATIONAL POL­
ICY (1978). 
82. See generally Wolf, Northern School Desegregation and Residential Choice, 
1977 SUP. CT. REV. 63. 
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student bodies would be relatively racially heterogeneous but more 
economically homogeneous. 
Without the ability to effect wealth redistribution or neighbor­
hood integration, the task for the courts is one of persuasion in 
which the persuasive qualities of judicial opinions alone are quite 
limited. How may courts devise new strategies for communication 
and persuasion which will lead to implementation of their decrees? 
One thinks of publicity campaigns, in-service training for teachers, 
83meetings with parents, workshops for administrators, and so on.
Even if these and other strategies can be identified and made to 
work, a matter easily disputed, their use would raise profound 
questions about the specific role of courts and the general role of 
governments in leading public opinion. 84 Propaganda, truth, and 
education are in the eyes of the beholder.85 One person's moral 
leadership is another's brainwashing. Democratic government is 
rooted in the ability and opportunity of each citizen to make and 
express judgments on matters of public concern and to use those 
judgments to influence government institutions. 86 If government 
crosses the line from education and leadership to an "engineered" 
consent, it ceases to be legitimate in democratic theory and fact. 
This is no less true of the judicial branch than of the executive or 
legislative branches. Furthermore, accommodating the politics of 
persuasion to the traditional model of adjudication may defY even 
the creative impulses of the Kirps and Kalodners of the legal com­
munity. If future studies of desegregation cases are to be taken se­
riously, these are precisely the types of questions of theory that 
must be addressed. 
83. An extensive public relations campaign involving widespread press, ra­
dio, and television coverage, personal appearances by members of the board, 
the superintendent, and new principal, was set up to inform parents of the 
magnet school concept and to encourage them to send their children. Mail­
ings to families with eligible sixth-grade children began.... 
P. 161. 
84. See generally Yudof, Government Expression and the First Amendment, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA (R. Collins ed. 1979) (publication pend­
ing); M. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Politics, Law and Government Expres­
sion in America (unpublished manuscript, 1979). 
85. See E. ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 55 (1972). 
86. See Yudof, supra note 84. C. FRANKEL, THE DEMOCRATIC PROSPECT 34 
(1962). 
